Markers for Psychosis and Mania

A recent review of the COMT genotype Met/VAL SNP on psychiatric phenotypes of schizophrenia, bipolar mood disorder and schizoaffective disorder seems to suggest that the SNP's effcet mya be more of modifying the symptoms (with Val conferring positive symptom susceptibility and MET negative symptom susceptibility) of psychosis and mania, rather than conferring susceptibility to the diseases per se. Also the association, in European populations primarily, would be between both psychosis and mania (schizoaffcetive) present rather than juts a simple diagnosis of schizophrenia or bipolarity.

The narrowing of COMT linkages to the combination of Mania and Psychosis loks like a step forward and the distinction between symptom modifying effects and the distinction between symptoms based on their being positive (additions of functionality) or negative (deletion of functionality) seems to be a step in the right direction.

This differential effect of having a Met or Val allele on symptom type (positive and negative) is also inline with the inverted U model of dopamine levels that suggests that there is a range of dopamine levels that is good for the body(brain) and beyond either end there are deleterious effects. It could be that while a Met allele confers protective advantage for positive symptoms, it is an aggravator for negative symptoms. Depending on dopamine environmental levels, the person having Met allele may or may not show the symptoms of mania/ scizophrenia.

I am also intrigued by the BDNF met/val allele effect on anxiety susceptibility and forced to think whether there too the effect may be that of symptom modification rather than susceptibility?

Tags: depression, schizophrenia, genetics

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Categorization, Memory, small-world networks and neural architecture

In the last post I had wondered about the clustering based solution to categorization and how they may also inform us about how memory (semantic variety) is stored in brain, as semantic memory is best modeled by an associational or confectionist network.

Thus, a semantic memory based on clustering models may consist of associations between clusters or categories of information. For example one cluster may correspond to the names of countries and another to name of cities. A particular type of connection or association between these two clusters may map a relation of ----IS A CAPITAL OF ---- type where for example the fact that Paris is the capital of France is stored. For this knowledge to exist, one has to have prior notions of France is a Country and Paris is a City and on top of that an associational relation between the individual entities France and Paris belonging to particular clusters.

Much of this would be more apparent once relational models of categorization are also covered. For now let us assume that (semantic) memory itself may consist of clusters of neurons that are also interconnected. Interestingly one such neural architecture, that has also been able to simulate short-term memory has been the small-world network model. In this a large number of nodes (neurons ) are connected by edges (synapses) as in a typical random graph. These small-world networks are special in the sense that they have high clustering coefficients and low mean path length. Translated in English, this means they exhibit more than chance clustering (to enhance local processing) as well as display a small value of smallest mean path length (reflecting ease of global processing).


It is intriguing thta in the short term memory model using small-world networks simulation, the researchers found that the model could exhibit bistability, which may be crucial for memory formation. In bistability, the cluster or functional region corresponding to a particular memory can be in two states, depending on an input variable. Thus, a pulse (direction of attention) can activate/ deactivate a memory.

Crucially, it can be hypothesized that as the small-world network model of memory/ categorization is good for local-global processing as well as reflective of the actual brain and AI simulation architectures, the entire brain is a small-world network adequately categorizing and representing the sensory, motor and cognitive information and processing them.


A recent MEG based study has established the fact that the small-world network topology exists in functional sphere in the brain at all oscillatory levels (crucial for binding) and that seems very promising.

Tags: categorization, memory, AI

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Categoristation: how to bookmark the interesting pages on the web!

In an earlier post, I had touched upon the different categorization theories that are in prevalence. One of these that was discussed in details was the prototype Vs exemplar method that was based on clustering and involved different representational methods of the categories thus derived.

This post is about how a new item is allocated to a pre-existing category. Simplistically, and in the last post this was the position I had taken, it seems apparent that by calculating the distance of a new item in feature space from the central tendencies of the neighboring clusters (the prototypes/ exemplars) one can find a best fit with one of the clusters and allocate the new item to that category.

This is simplistic as it explains fitting of new items to existing categories, but does not include any mechanisms for formation of new categories.

The analogical approach I take here is of how do I decide in which folder to add a new bookmark of an interesting page found on the web. Most probably the names I have chose for my bookmarks folders are reflective of the central tendencies (common prominent features) of all pages bookmarked in that folder. I would normally look at the new page, and also at my existing folders and see if there is a best fit. If so I juts file the new bookmark under the best-fit existing folder. Slightly extending the concept of categorization to resemble that of a schema, this is the classical case of assimilation in a schema.

However, in case the new web-page cannot be filed under any existing bookmark folder, I would usually create a new folder (with an adequate descriptive name based on the location of the web page in the feature space) and file the new bookmark under that new folder. This is akin to trying to fit in a novel item into existing clusters in the feature space, only to discover, it doesnt fit well with any cluster, but is an outlier. The best way to accommodate such an outlier , in my opinion, is to create a new cluster around the outlier. Extending this to schema, it is not hard to see that this is the classical case of accommodation and formation of a new schemata to incorporate a novel item that cannot be assimilated in existing schema.

Piaget, of course , stopped here (and so do I, sometimes, when managing my bookmarks!). but I would like to venture firth and discuss the other process that I engage in , very infrequently, to keep my bookmarks in good shape. This is what I would call reorganization or restructuring. when I restructure my bookmarks, I change the names, I move bookmarks form one folder to another , I merge bookmarks and also at times create more than a few sub folders. Also, interestingly, I delete some of the old bookmarks; while am captivated by some of the bookmarks and even forget to complete the restructuring part.

I believe that we too indulge in restructuring of our Schema/ categories periodically (it may be as frequent as daily during REM sleep) and that a crucial form of learning is not juts Assimilation and Accommodation, but also Restructuring. Also it is my contention, that we consciously remember anything only because we have actively restructured that information and embedded it in a contextual narrative. In the absence of restructuring, there can be information that can be used, but no conscious knowledge.

I plan to tie this up with the 3 factor model of memory that is emerging. One factor of the memory system uses familiarity detection (assimilation), the other novelty detection(accommodation), while the other involves conscious and contextual recollection(restructuring).

I also propose that these three factors are behind the three kinds of memory (content-wise and not duration wise). The first type of memory is semantic (or noetic)- facts like France's capital is Paris; the second is procedural (or anoetic) - learning how to drive- and is unconscious; while the third is episodic or autonoetic) - personally remembered events and feelings) . Of course memories would also differer along the time dimension- working memory, long-term memory etc. , but that discussion is for another day.

Also a brief not to myself - how this may be linked with Hughling-Jackson's theory of 3 states of consciousness and how they are differentially affected in dissociation- the autonoetic memory would be affected first- the noetic second and the anoetic or unconscious memory last in dissociation.

Returning back to categorization, this approach of adding new items either by assimilation, accommodation or restructuring is more guided my Mind-Is-A-Container metaphor. Other metaphors of mind- assuming it theory like - may yield to new and interesting views of how we form a theory-like theory of categorization. The other minor variation to above mind is a container metaphor may be using labels for bookmarks (instead of folders)- this is what Google bookmarks and del.icio are using. I haven't experimented with that approach to bookmarking extensively, so am not sure what new insights can be gained form them. For those readers, who use labels to organize bookmarks, their insights as comments, would be greatly appreciated.

Tags: learning, memory, categorization

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Moral Intuitions: Musings continued.

In the last post, we dwelled on the classical trolley problem as well as a new type of moral dilemma that may be termed as the Airplane dilemma.

In some versions of the Airplane (as well as the Trolley ) problem, the problem is framed so as to implore us into examining our notions of trusting or being suspicious of strangers (terrorists scenarios) and to take into account the past as well as future characteristics of these people (like high IQ and national celebrity status) to arrive at a moral decision, as to serving whom would be a more moral action for the doctor. The airplane problem mostly focuses on Trust Vs Suspiciousness dimension, is people-centered and focuses on assessing people and situations correctly in a limited amount of time. After the decision is made, then the action is more or less straight-forward.

The trolley problem is also similar, but of a somewhat different nature. Here, the focus is on actions and outcomes. The Morality of action is judged by its outcome as well as other factors like whether the (in) action was due to negligence, indirect, personalty motivated etc. The people centered focus is limited to using-as-means versus ends-in-themselves distinction and in the later problems (president-in-the-yard) that of guilty vs innocent. The innocent, careful child playing on unused track, while the careless , ignorant five idiots playing on the used track is another variation that plays on this careful action versus careless action distinction.

It is my contention that while the Trolley problem aptly makes clear the various distinction and subtleties involved in an Action predicate, viz whether the action is intentional, whether it is accidental- and if so how much negligence is involved; whether (in)action could be prevented/ executed differently for different outcomes etc; it does not offer much insight on how to evaluate Outcome Predicate or the Intention Predicates.

In the Trolley Problem, while the intentional vs accidental difference may guide our intuition regarding good and evil , in case of positive or negative outcomes; the careful versus careless (negligent) action guides our intuitions regarding the normal day-to-day good and bad acts. Here a distinction must be made between Evil (intentionally bad outcome) versus Bad acts(accidental or negligent bad outcome).One can even make a distinction between Good acts (performed with good intentions) versus Lucky acts (accidental good outcomes, maybe due to fortuitous care exhibited). Thus, a child playing on an unused track may juts be a 'bad' child; but five guilty men tied on tracks (even by a mad philosopher) are an 'evil' lot. Our intuitions, thus , would be different in the two cases and would not necessarily be determined by utilitarian concerns like number of lives.

Some formulations of the airplane problem, on the other hand , relate to quick assessment of people and situations and whether to trust or be suspicious. The problem is complicated by the fact that should the doctor invest time in gathering more data/ confirming/rejecting her suspicion versus acting quickly and potentially aggravating the situation/ long-term outcome. These formulations and our intuitive answers may tell us more about the intention predicates we normally use. Whether we intend to be trusting, innocent and trustworthy or suspicious, cautious and careful. If cautious and careful, how much assessment/ fact gathering we must first resort to to arrive at the correct decision, before committing to single-minded and careful action.
Should we juts look at the past for arriving at a decision, or should we also predict the future and take that into account? If we do predict the Outcomes, then the Consequence predicate is long-term or short-term? Is it an optimistic or a worst-case outcome scenario?

There are no easy answers. But neither is the grammar of any language supposed to be easy. Constructing valid and moral sentences as per a universal moral grammar should be an equally developmentally demanding task.

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History in the making - the neurogeneisis discovery

There is an old article by Jonah Lehrer in the Seed magazine regarding the historical process via which the fact of neurogenesis in the humna brain was discovered and established.

One of the findings related to the stress/depression and the-lack-of-neurogenesis linkage and the underlying mechanisms that are involved (including sertonergic triggering of cascade reactions that lead to increase in trophic factors). A corollary finding was that enriched environments also lead to more neurogenesis and can help heal the scars formed due to depression/stress by stimulating neurogenesis in the adult brain. How neurogenesis (in areas like hippocampus and dompaminergic neurons) leads to recovery from depression/ stress is still not clear.

To briefly summarize the findings (though it is highly recommended that you read the original article which is very well written):

1. Neurogenesis happens in adult brains (rats, primates and even humans).
2. Stress reduces neurogenesis.
3. Depression and reduced neurogenesis have been found to co-occur.
4. Enriched environments lead to increase in neurogeneisis. (in rats, marmoset monkeys)
5. Sertonin-based antidepressants primarily work by increasing neurogeneisis.

Hence inductively it seems probable that Low IQ is caused by Lower SES. (OK, this may seem like a joke...but do go and read the article and Gould's views on the stress and poverty relationships- and I find her views (and her supporting experimental and observational facts) quite plausible.)

The scientists profiled in the article, at that time, were still wondering (and actively exploring) the exact mechanism between neurogenesis and depression/ stress.

My hypothesis of why depression leads to less nurogenesis in hippocampus would be related to the role of hippocampus in memory and learning and how, for example, repeated exposure to shocks in rats leads the rats to exhibit a phenomenon known as 'learned helplessness'. Once the memory of a shockful and distressing repetitive experience is entrenched in the rat's memory, in the hippocampal region, she may not try to explore the environment that much, to discover and learn what has changed regarding the environment, and whether the stressful conditions and environments are over. This may lead to reduced neurogenesis as the rat's brain resigns itself to fate. This inability-to-learn or 'learning helplessness' (my slightly changed term for the same behavioral description) may lead to a vicious downward cycle leading to depression.

Once the neurogenesis is re-triggered, either due to administration of prozac or other antidepressants, or due to Cognitive behavioral therapy (and it had been found using brain scans that these two approaches seem to converge- one working in a top-down fashion (expecations and beliefs), while the other on a molecular and bottom-down fashion ), then the increased neurogenesis leads to an enhanced ability to learn and adapt and thus overcome the depressive epsiode and get rid of the symptoms. In both cases, the brunt of effort to get out of depression is still borne by the individual who is affected.

The other piece of information that caught my fancy was that of the dopimenergic neurogenesis and the potential cure of parkinson's disease based on targetting this pathway. Whether neurogenisis is limited to hippocampal regions, or also happens in the substatntia nigra/ VTA region (where I guess all the dopaminergic neurons reside) is an important question and my lead to more insight as to which all areas of the brain (or all areas) are susceptible to neurogenesis.

Tags: learning, depression, memory, plasticity

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Moral Intuitions (alternate title : Who framed roger rabbit?)

Disclaimer: Haven't seen the movie "Who framed roger rabbit", nor know the storyline- just used the alternate title as it is eye-catching:-))

Classical Moral intuitions research has focused on identifying how we arrive at moral conclusions. The Kohlberg's developmental theory is based around identifying the reasoning process, by which, the children arrive at a moral decision regarding a moral dilemma; or identifying an action that would be ethical in a given situation; or forming a moral judgment regarding a given event-outcome.

Much of the discourse is limited by the few example problems around which these dilemmas are framed. A good example is the famous Trolley problem, in which one has to decide whether it would be worth sacrificing a single person, in lieu of five or six others; and its variations involving whether one is in direct contact with the person and is performing an active action of 'sacrificing' the person by pushing him/her from the footbridge; or is merely a bystander and passively (from a distance) pulling a switch that would direct the trolley to a different track. Variations include whether the person (who if sacrificed could save five or six others) is related to you, or whether he is innocent (a child playing on an unused track) vis-a-vis those being sacrificed are careless and thus not worth saving ( stupid children playing on running tracks).

While some framing of this Trolley problem are in utilitarian terms- one life versus many others, other framings are in emotional & selfish versus sacrificial & rational terms -your child or your action vs other children and universal action (by universal action I mean the same action irrespective of whether you are in touch with the person (the footbridge case) or are merely pulling a lever).

The framing involving 'good/ careful' vs. 'bad/careless' in the good-boy-on-unused-track and bad-boys-on-used-tracks fascinates me the most.

At the outset, let me clarify that in regards to moral dilemmas of this sort, my personal position is reasonably clear. In a discussion some years back with some good friends (not over a cup of coffee; but over an intranet discussion group:-) , while we were discussing this dilemma, I had surmised that while we may debate endlessly what the action should be, the most reasonable guess one can make is that there would be no action at all. In the Trolley switch case, this means that the person my get so much frozen by the decision pressure and inability to arrive at a conclusion, that he/she may not pull the switch at all (the switch that would direct the train/ trolley to the unused track ). Instead, he may just remain frozen- just like one gets frozen sometimes in times of extreme fear- a third reaction apart from the usual fight or flight response. Yet, dilemmas, such as these, and our 'hypothetical' responses to these may somehow tell us more about how we reason about moral situations- whether it is post hoc (just like it is claimed that Consciousness is post hoc)- and if so, why would we be constructing different post-hoc moral reasons for the same dilemma when it is framed in different terms. (Hauser's research shows that the intuitions are different in the classical trolley (switch) versus the personal contact (footbridge) cases.)

Marc Hauser's lab is doing some excellent research in this field and though I have taken their Moral Sense Test, I have a feeling that I have stumbled on a new type of framing and dilemma (that was not present in their tests...though one can never be sure:0) that may enable us to reflect a bit more on our moral reasoning process.

I'll frame it first in neutral terms, and then try to refine it further. Let's call this the Aeroplane problem. Suppose that you are traveling in an Aeroplane, and there is only one doctor present on board, and the Air hostess staff is not sufficiently educated in all first aids. Suppose further that you are way above ground, with any emergency landing at least 20 minutes distant. Suppose, that their are two people on the Airplane, who start getting a third heart attack (they are both carrying medical histories/ badges that tell that it is the third and potentially fatal heart attack (BTW, why is the myth of 3rd heart attack being fatal so enduring?) ), and the heart attacks are almost simultaneous, and only the lone doctor on board can give them the first-aid and resuscitation (CPR) that could ensure that they both remain alive, till the airplane makes an emergency landing (the emergency landing may itself risk the life of all passengers slightly). Now, when all other details are unknown, it is potentially futile to ask which one to attend- you may as well choose one patient and concentrate all efforts on him/her.

Suppose, one of them is an octogenarian, while the other is a teenager. Now, which one should the doctor choose? Suppose one is an old lady, while the other is a young brat, which one should the doctor choose?

Suppose the Doctor has Asthma, and no body else knows how to administer the oral inhalation medicine correctly except for the doctor; then should the doctor take care of a patient or should he/she take care of himself/herself? what if there is only one patient and one doctor? What if there is one doctor and many patients? Would the decision be easy?

Suppose further, that out of the two persons, one is faking heart attack symptoms, while the other is genuinely suffering; should the doctor be able to find out who is who? Would this make the dilemma easier? Would we (the airplane travelers) respect the doctor's decision and let him /her attend to the person s/he thinks is genuinely suffering from heart attack?

Suppose further, that both the patients are terrorists and the doctor says that both are faking symptoms, potentially to hijack the plane; would we listen to the doctor and let him not attend to any of the potential causalities? Or would we try to help ourselves, potentially causing bedlam and fulfilling the plans of the terrorists?

I am sure by now you can conceive of other similar scenarios!! (one that comes to my mind is both the doctor and patient are accomplices and terrorists on-board to cause bedlam and mayhem and hijack the plane. Please let's add as many scenarios in the comments as possible.)

Now let us take a moment to reflect on our moral reasoning process. I believe most of us would be prone to go with our intuitions and would think about rationalizing our decisions later. Thank god, we do have some moral intuitions to guide us in time of indecision/ threat perception.

Suppose that instead of framing the last few scenarios in an anxiety provoking setting (involving terrorists and what-nots), we framed this in terms of forward-looking, futuristic terms.

Suppose that one of the patients is a very promising child (has an IQ of 200/ or is a sport prodigy and is as well-known as Sania Mirza) while the other is again a famous scientist indulging in some ground-breaking research (Say Marie Curie, whose Radioactivity discovery is definitely a very useful discovery); then who should the doctor choose? Should she look at their achievements or potentials? Or should she remain immune to all this and dispassionately ignore all (ir)relevant information? or should s/he be affected by age, gender, race, achievement, potential etc?

Suppose further that instead of well-known celebrities like Abdul Kalam , or Sachin Tendulkar, who are present in the plane, the younger patient is a product of genetic engineering, destined to become a great scientist/ artist/ whatever; while the older patient is working on a top-secret classified dual use research which potentially could help humanity overcome the impending fuel crisis (and related arctic melting, ozone hole etc crisis-she is working on a hydrogen powered (water as fuel) engine, which could be used in automobiles as well as in outer Space like Mars, where only water may be available for refueling). Also, both these persons are not well-known currently and not recognizable by the doctor/ crew/ passengers. Death of the older person would put humanity back by at least 40 years- only after 40 years would someone like the younger patient that the doctor saved (in case the doctor let the older patient die), could have worked out the designs for using water as a fuel again. Now which one should the doctor attend to? Should s/he attend to the young one or the old one? The future or the present?

Should she take the time out to see the credentials (the proof that this child is genetically modified to have a good IQ/ whatever and the proof that this scientist is indeed working on classified research that may potentially help millions) of the patients or should she just act on her intuitions? Why is the reasoning different here as compared to the threat-scenario?

What if the instead of Science frames above, we used frames of Art(I mean artistic frames and not the frames that visual artists use for paintings:-)....Art is much more than visual art:-).

Suppose, that one of them (the older one) could become a Paul Gauguin; while the other (younger one) could become a Van Gogh (again I mean an artist like Gogh and Gauguin, not their works of arts:-) ), now which one should the doctor choose? Why does it become irrelevant as to who should be saved if the frame is of Art, but a question of life-and-death if the frame is of Science?

Finally, some things to note and think about: the Airplane problem is entirely framed in life-saving context (doctor helping save a life); while the Trolley problem is entirely in death-prevention context (someone acting messiah and preventing death of five Vs One; good vs careless etc). Again, Doctors usually give rise to feminine frames with one assuming a doctor to be a female; while the Foreman's are usually entirely male. I hardly believe that framing is all of the problem; or that the framing is done deliberately: the framer of the problems/ dilemmas is equally susceptible to the same framing effects that the readers have experienced-while formulating a problem (a moral dilemma) one may fall prey to the same sorts of Frames that we become susceptible to when thinking about the problems (the moral dilemmas). Thus, the aphorisms, that (paraphrasing) "It is equally important to ask the right questions, as it is to find the answers to the problems". Translated in the language of the scientific research world, this becomes that "it is important to design good experiments/ observation-study-setups and be very careful about the study designs."

Returning back to the issue of framing of moral problems, if the frame exists it is also because of our history: just like the moral intuitions - that at times help us survive and at times let us fall prey to frames- are due to our shared evolutionary history: so too the frames we use to cast and perceive the moral dilemmas are rooted in our history ( Nothing profound- what I mean by shared history is that someone formulated the problems in those terms, silly!!.)

I believe the problem is more with our inability to detach ourselves form frames and take more reasonable perspectives and know when to use our intuitions and when reason. As the saying goes "It is by the fortune of God that, in this country, we have three benefits: freedom of speech, freedom of thought, and the wisdom never to use either." Mark Twain (1835-1910). Alternately, another related saying that comes to mind(paraphrasing) " God, give us the ability to change what we can, humility to accept what we cannot and the wisdom to know what is what". We perhaps cannot change the historical frames or intuition that are in place, but we can definitely change our moral reasoning powers and following a developmental framework have compassion and understanding towards those who might not be employing the highest levels of moral reasoning.

Finally, If you are interested in my moral intuitions, I hypothesize, that the doctor (in the plane) would not be affected by Age, gender, race, potential, achievement etc would overcome his/ her Implicit Associations and would not try to find-out or gather-information deliberately to determine which life is more valuable- He/she would end up rushing between the patients and helping both at the same time; but if he/she is an intelligent doctor, would definitely save his/her life first, if suffering from Asthma, so that he/she could take care of others. This might seem like a rationalization (saving one's life so that one can help in whatever small way others), but one should use intelligence, even before emotions or moral instincts take center stage.

I believe that in the Airplane Scenario described above, there is a potential for a histrionic/hysteric reaction of the crew and travelers, as everyone tries to help the patients, (especially if no doctor is on-board) and that this may be the reverse of the bystander-effect like phenomenon I have hypothesized might happen in the Trolley problem (freezing and taking no action when a train is approaching towards five or six humans or towards a lone human). To make more sense of preceding line please read comments by Mc
Ewen on Mind Hacks post titled " "Mass Hysteria" closes school". Also, a solemn and personal request, please do not jump to conclusions, read or try to co-relate things out of context- or try to make sense of psychological concepts based on everyday usage of terms. If you do not understand any concepts mentioned above, read related literature and focus on that aspect alone- to the exclusion of other distracting eye-catchers. In case of any persisting confusions, feel free to ask your local psychiatrist/ psychologist/ psychology professor as to what those concepts mean.

PS: I believe that the post has become difficult-to-read, this was not done intentionally. Again, there might be spelling mistakes/ grammatical errors- don't get alarmed/ confused that this reflects racing thoughts etc- just point them out and I'll fix them- most of the times the editorial errors (some of them quite funny) are due to lack of time to revise/ lethargy to read. Also, this is also a part of my ongoing series, where I have posited that their may be gender differences in cognitive styles. Some of that may also be a required reading.

Tags: moral sense, conceptual metaphors, cognition, intelligence

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Schizophrenia, Religion, Autism and the Indian culture (alternate title: Life, The Universe and Everything)

In continuation of my focus on the Schizophrenia-Autism dichotomy, I'll like to highlight two articles that seem to support my view.

The first is a blog post by, John Horgan, speculating whether religiosity is the inverse of autism.

The anthropologist Stewart Guthrie proposes that religious experiences—and particularly those involving visions or intuitions of a personal God--may stem from our innate tendency toward anthropomorphism, “the attribution of human characteristics to nonhuman things or events.” Guthrie called his book on this theory Faces in the Clouds, but he could have called it Jesus in the Tortilla.

Recent findings in developmental psychology dovetail with Guthrie’s theory. By the age of three or four all healthy children manifest an apparently innate ability to infer the state of mind of other people.

Psychologists postulate that autism stems from a malfunction of the theory-of-mind module. Autistics have difficulty inferring others’ thoughts, and even see no fundamental distinction between people and inanimate objects, such as chairs or tables. That is why autism is sometimes called “mind-blindness.”

But many of us have the opposite problem—an overactive theory-of-mind capacity, which leads to what the psychologist Justin Barrett calls “hyperactive agent detection.” When we see squares and triangles moving around a screen, we cannot help but see the squares “chasing” the triangles, or vice versa, even when we are told that the movements are random.

This is compatible with this blog's Schizophrenia-is-the-inverse-of-Autism theory for the following reasons:

1. Too much belief in agency in Schizophrenics (the hyperactive Agent detector conceptualized above) vs too less belief in agency in Autistics - characterized by me earlier as a Fantasy/Imagination Vs Reality orientation - has a direct relevance to whether one attributes anthropomorphic agency to non-living things and events (and thus Nature or God) or even fails to attribute intention to humans and animals and assumes them to be mere automata. I believe while a schizophrenic mindset can be characterized by a suspension-of-disbelief and too much causality and intention attribution (thus leading to the mindset compatible with religious/ spiritual leanings), the autistic mindset would lead to too much skepticism, too much even-causal-happenings-are-only-coincidental mindset and a reductionist, atheistic mindset that attributes no intention to humans, least of all animals, and believes that they are just advanced machines. I guess both are extremes of delusion, in one case one characterizes that as the GOD delusion; but the other extremist who sees no role of agency or intentionality (even in humans) is hauled as a great scientist!!

2. Another prominent dimension on which the Schizophrenics and autistic differ is the Literal-Metaphor dimension. I would like to frame that in terms of a Reference-Meaning use of a linguistic word and the consequent distinction in linguistics between a symbol as a referent of something and a symbol as signifying a meaning. For an excellent commentary on this difference, please do read this classical paper.

Meaning, let us remember, is not to be identified with naming. Frege's example of 'Evening Star' and 'Morning Star' and Russell's of 'Scott' and 'the author of Waverly', illustrate that terms can name the same thing but differ in meaning. The distinction between meaning and naming is no less important at the level of abstract terms. The terms '9' and 'the number of the planets' name one and the same abstract entity but presumably must be regarded as unlike in meaning; for astronomical observation was needed, and not mere reflection on meanings, to determine the sameness of the entity in question.

It is my contention that while the Schizophrenics are meaning obsessed; the Autistics are more reference obsessed, and thus have problems with metaphorical and figurative speech. From linguistics one can stretch the Meaning-Reference distinction and conceive of too much meaning orientation in schizophrenics ( and a meaningful life requires a GOD that gives a meaning to our lives) versus a nihilistic orientation in autistics that views the life/ evolution as purposeless. As many evolutionists famously claim - there is no meaning inherent in evolution, life or humans - rather that the question of meaning is invalid. Life just is.

3. Many schizophrenic delusions can be explained by an extreme manifestation of religiosity/ spirituality. As Szasz famously said, " If you talk to God, you are praying; if God talks to you you have schizophrenia". Both a belief in GOD and his ability to listen to our prayers (the religious belief) and the converse belief that God can talk to us , many times in symbolic ways, but sometimes in the form of actual auditory hallucinations are a manifestation of the same cognitive mechanism that attributes too much agency, causality and meaning. Many schizophrenics, indeed do suffer from delusion of Grandeur, whereby they think of themselves as GOD-like; or the delusion of persecution and paranoia whereby they are persecuted by Satan like evil figures. thus both hallucinations as well as the common delusions are explainable by the religiosity orientation. this time the GOD delusion is different - one believes that one is a god-head. In non-religious cultures, these being-GOD delusions may take the non-religious forms of being a famous historical person (who had great agency and effect on Human history and is presumably now active via the agency of the deluded schizophrenic), and the persecution delusions may not refer to Satan- but to their non-secular counterparts- the CIA and the government!! Of course the pathological forms of an Autistic mindset, that may have nihilistic orientations, and out of boredom and feelings of meaninglessness, may resort to meaningless acts of violence like the Columbine Massacres is one direction which needs further study.

I would now like to now draw focus on the Cultural differences post where I had speculated on the different incidences rates of Schizophrenia and Autism in the East Asian and American cultures based on the differential emphasis on holistic and contextual versus analytical and local processing and cognition and also presented some supporting evidence. The well documented religious/spiritual inclination of Oriental cultures versus the Scientific/materialistic orientation of the American and western cultures may be another factor that would affect and explain the relative incidences of Schizophrenia and Autism in these cultures.

In a culture like India, in which the people believe in 18 crore (180 billion) Gods and Deities, believe in reincarnation and believe that every human being is potentially divine, if a human errs towards an extreme and starts developing funny ideas of being a God herself, then that may not ring the alarm bells immediately. Rather some form of that delusion may even be encouraged (that is why in India names are kept after the Gods and Deities; while its rare to find the name Jesus in West, you can find millions of Rams in India). If the same GOD-delusion develops in an American, then his idea of being Jesus (or an angel) would definitely be detected early, lead to an earlier 'label' and an earlier hospitalization.

That said, I would now like to draw attention to an article today in the Times Of India, that pointed me to some more literature that unequivocally shows that not only are the incidence rates of schizophrenia less in India (and other third world (Asian) countries), the prognosis is manifold better in Indian patients as compared to American patients.

The success story of schizophrenics in India was propagated by mental health professionals based on the WHO research DOSMeD in 1979. This was carried out in 10 countries including developing ones such as India, Nigeria and Columbia. The findings showed striking differences in the prognosis of schizophrenia between developed and developing countries. The underlying causes for the diversity were associated more with family and social variables than clinical determinants. Majority of patients in developing countries showed remission over two years; only 50 per cent of them had a single relapse though around 15 per cent never recovered. Patient outcome in developing countries was superior to that in developed economies.

This difference has been hypothesized to be due to the strong family structure (and I do believe that it is an important factor) and the social cushion, support and acceptance that a family provides to the patient and shields him/her from stressful situations that may trigger a relapse.

This theory of a family-protective-advantage has come under attack recently, but I think the attack is flawed because it clubs countries not according to Cultures, but according to developmental status. Indeed, the other factor that may be affecting a better outcome in schizophrenic patients may be the cultural differences like the different cognitive/perceptual styles and a more tolerance for religious/spiritual/ mystical ideas. By shielding a person from stigmatization and isolation, based on eccentricities exhibited along these dimensions, one may be preventing or delaying relapse, and ensuring better outcome by not pushing the person over the edge. In the pats, it was not infrequent, for those who had psychotic experiences to be labeled as shamans and to be treated with respect, rather than stigma and isolation; thus ensuring that they were not exposed to social stresses in the future.

I have taken a somewhat deprecating attitude towards the extreme autistic orientation characterized by no intentionality, causality, spiritual beliefs, but I am a strong believer in the fact that though the extreme manifestation of Autism/Schizophrenia makes one dysfunctional, a pronounced autistic/ schizophrenic orientation does endow one with creative faculties - either to understand and manipulate the world (the Sciences) or to understand and manipulate the subjective experiences (the Arts) . In particular, as the readers of this blog would most likely be scientists, and because I belong the the scientific community and have failed to see how a scientific orientation is incompatible with an artistic/symbolic/spiritual orientation , I have taken a harder line for the extreme Atheist and nihilism zealots.

I believe one can, and must, utilize the different types of cognitive abilities these extreme manifestations and disorders caricature. Do let me know what your think!

Tags: schizophrenia, autism, culture, cognition, intelligence

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Savor the brain delicacies: encephalon 12 served hot and spicy at the AlphaPsy

The latest Encephalon, available at the AlphaPsy, is a mouth-watering treat that is not to be missed for life. It is not only delicious, but also healthy and wholesome.

You can jump to the main course, which starts with this blog's contributions, or you can savor the appetizers first like the recent research implicating entorhinal cortex with stimulus novelty detection and hippocampus with associative novelty detection based on comparing the stimulus with an expectation that is generated based on the last presented stimulus. This lines up neatly with earlier studies I have reported regarding three dissociated process of novelty, familiarity and recollection detection and the place and grid cells present in hippocampus and the associated cognitive map theory of the hippocampal function.

There are other delicacies ranging from the humpback whales spindle neurons to the self-fulfilling-prophecy effects that lead to bad luck for Vietnamese children born in bad luck years.

Recalling the feast has already made me hungry again, so I am going back to have a second course, or at least a few more desserts. Hope you manage to get there before me; don't complain if the stocks get exhausted!!

Tags: blogs, carnival

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