Readership survey

I am experimenting with Polls at present and would like to start with a simple poll to find the readership composition of this blog. So please take some time to answer this simple poll . This would not only help me know my readers better but would hopefully result in better content suited to your needs and also enable more interaction in future via polls.

You can access the poll on the sidebar.

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generic vs specific feedback and the fundamental attribution error

A recent study indicates that giving generic trait-based feedback to children ( in the form of "you are a good drawer") increases feeling of helplessness on subsequent mistakes/failures and reduces their resilience in the face of failure in comparison to the condition in which they are given specific outcome-based feedback (of the form " you drew a good drawing"). It is thus apparent that when generic praise is given, then this results in a stable inborn talent-like view of the self abilities, while a specific praise enforces more a concept of skill-based self ability that may be affected by circumstances and can be worked on and acquired.

Generic praise implies there is a stable ability that underlies performance; subsequent mistakes reflect on this ability and can therefore be demoralizing. When criticized, children who had been told they were “good drawers” were more likely to denigrate their skill, feel sad, avoid the unsuccessful drawings and even drawing in general, and fail to generate strategies to repair their mistake. When asked what he would do after the teacher’s criticism, one child said, “Cry. I would do it for both of them. Yeah, for the wheels and the ears.” In contrast, children who were told they had done “a good job drawing” had less extreme emotional reactions and better strategies for correcting their mistakes.

It is interesting to read this along with the fundamental attribution error, which was the theme of my blogger SAT challenge essay. As per this bias, people have an inherent bias to view their successes in terms of stable underlying talents/traits and failures as reflective of external circumstances. The reasoning reverses when applied to others. Others fare well due to luck (or external circumstances) and fare badly due to dispositional elements.

From the above study, it is clear that though the fundamental attribution error may serve us well (after all it has to serve a purpose for it to evolve), say by increasing our feelings of self-efficacy and thus leading to greater confidence/esteem, yet it has its downside. It makes learning from our mistakes harder and leads to feelings of helplessness or that of external locus of control, when faced with failures. This rationalization of failures due to our helplessness (despite perceived stable talent/trait) , and due to the external circumstances ( and not as due to some carelessness or lack of effort on our part on this specific circumstance) also leads to less resilience in the face of failures and less motivation to indulge in similar activity in the future.

It is apparent thus, that while giving positive feedback to children, it is framed in specific outcome based terms, so that they do not fall prey to the fundamental attribution bias and pay more emphasis on skill-based accounts rather than talent-based accounts. Conversely, it may be plausible to presume that while giving negative feedback it would be best to be direct and point any underlying issue that the child may have and not gloss them over by providing environmental explanations. The child would anyway make up environmental excuse for the failures!

While inspiring the child to undergo observational learning, one should presumably describe others and their success as resulting from stable traits/ skills and should explain their failures due to circumstance not in their control. This would go a long way in making the child overcome his inherent attribution bias and help in lead to a generally positive and compassionate view of others and a resilient and humble view of himself.

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Language and Cognition: a developmental framework revealed by color term analysis

There have been various claims about the ability of language to shape thought and perception, and one of the oft-cited phenomenon supporting this sapir-whorf hypothesis is the evolution of color terms in languages and how the lack of a color term in a language may influence the ability of that language user to make categorical distinctions between colors or to perceive the differing colors.

The basic color terms were originally proposed by Berlin and Kay (1969) in their seminal study 'Basic Color Terms, their Universality and Evolution' in which they proposed that different languages (written/ oral) have evolved to differing levels and that a culture would start with only two color terms, equivalent to black and white or dark and light, before adding subsequent colors closely in the order of red; green and yellow; blue; brown; and orange, pink, purple, and gray. Based on this they proposed a grouping of the ninety-eight languages studied into seven stages of an evolutionary sequence running from primitive languages with words only for WHITE and BLACK to more advanced languages with words for the whole range of colors.

1. STAGE I : WHITE BLACK: Nine languages:7 New Guinea 1 Congo 1 South India
2. STAGE II: WHITE BLACK RED: Twenty-one languages:2 Amerindian 16 African 1 Pacific 1 Australian Aboriginal 1 South India
3. STAGE III
   
1. STAGE IIIa: WHITE BLACK RED GREEN: Eight languages:6 African 1 Philippine 1 New Guinea
1. STAGE IlIb: WHITE BLACK RED YELLOW:Nine languages:2 Australian Aboriginal 1 Philippine 3 Polynesian 1 Greek (Homeric) 2 African
4. STAGE IV: WHITE BLACK RED GREEN YELLOW:Eighteen languages:12 Amerindian 1 Sumatra 4 African 1 Eskimo 380
5. STAGE V: WHITE BLACK RED GREEN YELLOW BLUE:Eight languages:5 African 1 Chinese 1 Philippine 1 South India
6. STAGE VI : WHITE BLACK RED GREEN YELLOW BLUE BROWN:Five languages:2 African 1 Sumatra 1 South India 1 Amerindian
7. STAGE VII: COMPLETE ARRAY OF COLORS :Twenty languages: 1 Arabic 2 Malayan 6 European 1 Chinese 1 Indian 2 African 1 Hebrew 1 Japanese 1 Korean 2 South East Asian 1 Amerindian 1 Philippine

This schema of classification has been revisited in light of recent research, mostly the World Color Survey, and Kay and Maffi (1999), in Color Appearance and the Emergence and Evolution of Basic Color Lexicons, discuss the results to come up with a five stage developmental model of languages based on black, white, red, yellow, green, blue terms only and leave from the analysis other basic terms like brown, orange, purple and pink.

Their stages of languages are essentially the same as that of Berlin and Kay with stage IIIA (White, black, red, green) being more conman than stage IIIB (White, black, red, yellow) in the stage III languages.

Cognitive Daily ran a recent commentary on the World Color Survey , and as per the analysis presented there, it is apparent that the 41 languages covered there belonged to the stage V languages and the rest 69 languages belonged to stage IV languages (and in these languages as no separate word for Blue is present, hence the blue-green color is perceived as same and also labeled as Grue i.e. Blue and green are confused. The results that across cultures, people, if they have a term for a particular color in their language, then they do agree to the actual color hue that the color term corresponds to, across cultures, is a strong argument in favor of universality of color categories. thus, the blue of one language is the same as the blue of the other language and this is most probably due to the underlying physiology. See my blog posts related to color perception in humans in this regard.

Conversely, the fact that those languages that had no term for blue (but only had a common term Grue for blue and green), also found it difficult to distinguish between blue and green hues, suggests that having a term for a color does influence the way in which we categorize the colors and possibly also the way we perceive them. The latter (influence on perception) may be a more controversial claim, but the fact that color terms affect cognition (categorization) is relatively uncontroversial.

It is instructive to pause here, and note some facts from color vision physiology. The rods give us an ability to see even in dark and may have been the first to evolve, giving us the concepts of black and white. The cones may have evolved later to give a sense of colors. The opponent process utilizing Red cones and green cones gives rise to the perception of colors Red and Green. It is plausible that first the Red cones evolved (in evolutionary time-frame), giving a Red signal and thus a Red qualia/ Red color term. Later came the green cones to give a green signal and a green qualia/ green color term. The R+G opponent process was born later and refined the perception of Red and Green. It is also plausible that the brain started combining Red and Green signal (R+G) to perceive Yellow. Thus , a perception of Red, Green and Yellow would be generated by the brain, based on the two Red and Green cones only. The R+G =Y signal does exist in the brain and is one of the signals involved in the opponent processes of Blue-Yellow perception. The Blue cones apparently came the last and using the signal from blue cone and the Y=R+G signal, the opponent process of Blue-Yellow perception enabled, the perception of Blue qualia too and a corresponding color term for Blue too. Further, it is instructive to note that brown color (the stage V to stage VI transition of languages based on color terms) is perceived in the brain by a complex process involving signals from both R-G and B-Y opponent processes (specifically mixing of Red and Yellow at a point in space to give orange) and comparing and contrasting this information with the intensity (Black-white achromatic signal) of the surrounding region. This, leap from opponent-processes to a perception based on contrast with surrounding areas, marks a significant leap ( as is common in all developmental stage VI transformations) in perceptual mechanism employed and correspondingly the terms for Brown are more rare and difficult to be claimed as being universal in all languages and must have evolved later. The stage VII and VIII perceptual processes may determine how we perceive purple, pink, orange and gray but a more physiological analysis of perceptual mechanism involve would have to wait for another day, and by another more informed vision researcher. Here it would suffice to note that there are sound physiological reasons for why the color terms may have evolved in the way did over historical and evolutionary time scales and how some modern languages may still not be having terms for some colors the ability to distinguish which might have evolved recently and based on the different perceptual processes involved may not be the same in all cultures.

Before speculating further, it would serve us well to get acquainted with the latest consensus regarding the color terms and what they inform us regarding language and cognition. Kay and Regeir (2005) in their article Language, thought, and color: Recent developments, TICS , aptly summarize the state of the art view that involves an interactionist view where both Nature and Nurture, Universalism and Relativism have their place and are involved. As per them,

The language-and-thought debate in the color domain has been framed by two questions:
1. Is color naming across languages largely a matter of arbitrary linguistic convention?
2. Do cross-language differences in color naming cause corresponding differences in color cognition?

In the standard rhetoric of the debate, a ‘relativist’ argues that both answers are Yes, and a ‘universalist’ that both are No. However, a number of recent studies, when viewed in aggregate, undermine these traditional stances. These studies suggest instead that there are universal tendencies in color naming (i.e. No to question 1) but that naming differences across languages do cause differences in color cognition (i.e. Yes to question 2).

We have already seen how the concept of Focal colors (as outlined by Kay) is valid and seems to constitute a universal cognitive basis for both color language and color memory. Further, we have seen some neuro-physiological support for the emergence of focal colors red, yellow, green, blue and brown. Jameson and D’Andrade have argued that the universal focal colors are
salience maxima in color space and that universals of color naming flow from a process that partitions color space in a way that maximizes information. A recent study by Griffin LD (2006), The Basic Colour Categories are optimal for classification. J Roy Soc: Interface 3(6):71-85, seems to support this hypothesis and posits that the eleven basic color categories identified by Kay are optimal and useful in computer machine vision too. All these evidences are compatible with each other and suggest that the basic properties and number of color categories, compatible with optimal color space partitioning, have led to the emergence of corresponding neuro-physiological/ perceptual apparatus in humans to detect these categories, and has thus led to that many number of color terms to evolve in the degree of complexity of these mechanisms/ incremental advantage they provide in categorization.

On the relativistic side it is claimed, that the cognitive variables like privileged memory, similarity judgments, or paired associates learning for focal colors are well predicted by the boundaries of each language’s color categories: a form of categorical perception of color. Since these boundaries vary across languages, speakers of different languages apprehend color differently. Moreover, these linguistic differences seem to actually cause, rather than merely correlate with, cognitive differences.The argument is further that color terms are arbitrary and the color terms determine the perception of colors absolutely. Roberson, Davidoff et al, in Color Categories are not universal: New evidence from Traditional and Western cultures , argue that the evidence supporting focal colors and the concept of universal categorical perception arising from them, . viz privileged memory for them or paired associate learning for the proposed universal colors, is rendered incorrect, when the effect of verbalization (or use of linguistic tokens) is taken into account. As per them (emphasis mine) :

In native English speakers a series of experiments found that verbal interference selectively removed the defining features of Categorical Perception. Under verbal interference, there was no longer the greater accuracy normally observed for cross-category judgments compared to within-category judgments. It thus appears that while both visual and verbal codes may be employed in the recognition memory of colors, subjects only make use of verbal coding when demonstrating Categorical Perception (Roberson & Davidoff, 2000). In a brain-damaged patient suffering from a naming disorder, the loss of labels radically impaired his ability to categorize colors

Participants from a traditional hunter-gatherer culture, whose language contains five basic color terms (under the definition of Kay Berlin & Merrifield, 1991), showed no tendency towards a cognitive organization of color resembling that of English speakers. They did not find best examples of English color categories easier to learn or remember than poor examples and, in a further set of experiments, evidence of Categorical Perception was found in both languages, but only at their own linguistic category boundaries.

Although the authors draw extreme conclusions from their findings, but Kay moderates the viewpoint and concludes: (emphasis mine)

It has been widely assumed that language is the cause of color categorical perception. This is suggested since – as we have seen – named category boundaries vary across languages, and categorical perception varies with them. However, Franklin and Davies have found startling evidence of categorical perception at some of these same boundaries in pre-linguistic infants and toddlers of several languages. Thus, some categorical color distinctions apparently exist prior to language, and may then be reinforced, modulated, or eliminated by learning a particular language.

This finally brings us to the post by Developing Intelligence regarding labels as an accelerator of ontological development. In this, though in the beginning itself, Chris dismisses the strong form of Sapir-Whorf hypothesis (esp. in relation to colors) , he presnts a study that leads to a reasonable conclusion that language can accelerate the process of sortal/kind discrimination, such that a skill normally only demonstrated by 12-month-olds was in this case demonstrated by 9-month-olds with the proper linguistic input. Here, one is not arguing that the sortal/kind discrimination would not have been possible in the absence of linguistic inputs- one is merely claiming that the sortal/kind discrimination is facilitated by language and happens early in the developmental cycle based on linguistic labels. And definitely not having labels leads to a different cognitive/ perceptual experience in the infants as compared to those infants who use labels and can make the sortal/kind discrimination.

Form the above, it may be inferred, that though universal focal colors and color categories do exist (based on underlying neurophysiology or spectral properties of the visible-to-humans world), they may be available to consciousness at different stages of an infant's (or a culture or a language's ) development, and having labels or color terms for the categories may facilitate an early maturation of the color categorizations faculty. Depending on where a culture, or language is on its developmental path, lack of proper color terms may limit their ability to perceive colors as belonging to different categories for which they don't have a label.

Interestingly, in the Davidoff study, a brain damaged patient suffering from an inability to label things, was impaired in categorizing colors.

Though the exact mechanism by which labels or color terms may work is still elusive with multiple competing hypothesis (viz., labels facilitate sortal/kind distinctions by aiding a domain-general, non-linguistic process, such as memory; or that labels increase the salience of perceptual feature differences between object) , yet it is clear that labels are instrumental and play a definitive role in the ontological development of the child.

One may take a strong line and argue, that in the absence of color terms or labels, one would not be able to have a full cognitive color categorization or sortal/kind discrimination experience, but even if one does not subscribe to the extreme view, it seems plausible that different developmental levels of languages identified by the linguistic color terms in the languages correspond to different levels of cognitive experiences that are more readily available in the corresponding culture.

Thus, while language does affect thought and vice versa, both may be constrained by the developmental stage at which a culture is. The cognitive experience and the cognitive developmental stage from which that experience results would correspond to the stage of development of that language and vice versa. Thus, some cultures, by not using a language that is fully evolved/ developed, may not be experiencing the full range of cognition and emotion that is humanly possible. Conversely, based on the linguistic devices utilized by a culture, their cognitive experiences may differ from another culture that utilizes another incompatible set of linguistic devices.

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Cognitive and Physical Fitness

In an interesting study, it has been found that high BMI (or excess body weight) in middle-aged adults is linked to cognitive decline. Though the experts have been focusing on a physical causal relationship (mediated by effects of lack of physical exercise on blood vessels / insulin), another plausible hypothesis is that those who have the personality attributes that dispose them towards laziness and a propensity towards lack of physical exertion/ exercise, may similarly be disinclined to use their cognitive capacities to the fullest and exhibit mental laziness too. As the evidence for 'use it or lose it' in relation to cognitive capacities is mounting, the 'lazy'/ 'careless'/ 'challenging' attitude may be the underlying factor reflected in both physical decline (obesity) as well as cognitive decline.

A brain fitness movement currently seems to be gaining momentum, and a new blog SharpBrains has expertise in precisely that niche. They are running a survey and you can let the authors know what content you will like to be featured more on that site. Exercise your brain to the fullest, but don't neglect that good old physical regimen, as it may have a determining effect too.

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Encephalon University carnival online now

The new edition of Encephalon is online now at the Cognitive Daily. I was pleasantly surprised to discover that a first honorary doctorate (professorship!) has been granted to me by this esteemed university. Go on to the university carnival to read gems from my fellow emeritus professors at the Encephalon University.

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Attention/ Memory/Learning: double dissociation between ACC and PFC

I recently came across two studies both of which were pointing towards a double dissociation between ACC and PFC, in the realm of Working Memory Attentional processes in one case and the learning mechanisms (or acquisition and performance of a cognitive skill) in the other case.

In the first study by Kane and Engle, a stroop interference task was used to find the different attentional factors at work that determine the successful execution of the task. Using some clever experiments, it was demonstrated that two selective attentional mechanisms were involved- one that was related to goal maintenance and was active pre-stimulus presentation and the other that was active post-stimulus presentation and was related to inhibition of inappropriate bottom-up responses (the automatic response as per the linguistic color-denoting word in incongruent condition instead of as per the actual color of the word that was demanded by the task) and selection of relevant response from the competing responses.

As per the abstract of the study:

Individual differences in working-memory (WM) capacity predicted performance on the Stroop task in 5 experiments, indicating the importance of executive control and goal maintenance to selective attention. When the Stroop task encouraged goal neglect by including large numbers of congruent trials (RED presented in red), low WM individuals committed more errors than did high WM individuals on the rare incongruent trials (BLUE in red) that required maintaining access to the "ignore-the-word" goal for accurate responding. In contrast, in tasks with no or few congruent trials, or in high-congruency tasks that followed low-congruency tasks, WM predicted response-time interference. WM was related to latency, not accuracy, in contexts that reinforced the task goal and so minimized the difficulty of actively maintaining it. The data and a literature review suggest that Stroop interference is jointly determined by 2 mechanisms, goal maintenance and competition resolution, and that the dominance of each depends on WM capacity, as well as the task set induced by current and previous contexts.

As per this line of reasoning, errors in the stroop task are thought to result from failure to actively maintain a goal in mind and may thus be related to memory retrieval per se. On the other hand, reaction time slowing is thought to result from a post-stimulus attentional process - a failure to quickly bias competition towards the correct representation rather than the incorrect representation and might also be perceived as an attentional control mechanism- whereby attention is not diverted to irrelevant stimuli that are not consistent with the goal in WM.

Developing Intelligence presents some additional observations to bolster the argument:

• Across all subjects, the amount of RT facilitation (i.e., how much faster congruent trials are than neutral trials) correlates with error interference (i.e., how much more accurate neutral trials are than incongruent trials), suggesting that goal maintenance failure is behind both of these phenomena. In contrast, there is no correlation between the RT facilitation effect and RT interference, as would be expected if goal maintenance failure actually gives rise to all of these measures, nor is there a correlation between error & latency interference. The implication being that errors (and the related RT facilitation) are due to one process and response time latency/interference due to another process involved in attending to ambiguous (multiple response generating) stimuli.
• On high-congruency Stroop tasks, schizophrenics show increased errors on incongruent relative to congruent trials, and increased facilitation on congruent relative to neutral trials. The implication being that in schizophrenics only one of the attention mechanism is selectively dysfunctional - that related to goal maintenance. As presumably, schizophrenics do not show abnormal patterns of reaction times (except for increased RT facilitation on congruent trails governed by the lack of maintenance of goal - 'ignore-the-color') , thus, the second mechanism involving selection of competing responses is intact.
• ERP studies of Stroop tasks have identified a wave that may originate from anterior cingulate (ACC) and appears to correspond to response selection and competition processes; in contrast, the activity of a different wave up to 800 ms before stimulus presentation predicts correct performance on the next stimulus (and appears to originate from polar or dorsolateral frontal cortex [dlPFC]). The implication being that dissociated brain regions are involved in priming for the response (goal maintain ace) and selection of response ( conflict resolution - inhibition of inappropriate responses)
• Event-related fMRI shows a strong negative correlation between delay-period dlPFC activity and Stroop interference, whereas ACC activity is tied to the presentation of incongruent stimuli. The implication being that PFC activity is related to errors and thus the process of goal maintenance, while ACC activity is related to peculiarities arising from incongruence - that is when competing responses are available- and thus tied to the process of response selection (inhibition of inappropriate response).

A clinching observation that could seal the argument about two dissociated mechanisms would be observing a correlation between errors on incongruent trials under 0 congruence condition (where the effect of goal maintenance has been effectively factored out by forcing subjects to keep the goal in mind on every trial), or better to display the goal (the rule that you have to choose as per the color and not the linguistic word) while the stimuli are presented to ensure that the goal is maintained constantly, and observe the correlations between errors in preceding condition and response time latencies/interference in the normal stroop task. This correlation would ensure that there indeed is an independent attentional mechanism that is independent of goal maintenance and is dependent only on conflict resolution.

In the second study by Fincham and Anderson, a learning paradigm was used whereby some sports names were associated with some arithmetical rules (that were either implicitly learned or explicitly told) and in the trials the subjects were required to retrieve the rule and apply it. There were four conditions - a visible-rule and rule-retrieval condition (supposed to measure the effects of the rule retrieval process) and a reverse/ forward calculation condition (supposed to measure the effect of rule complexity condition - a forward-reverse application of rule introduces another control step).

The authors discovered that in the first experiment, where there were four different trial conditions, recall (rule-retrieval condition) had a significant effect on both latencies and errors, they also found (but glossed over) a minor effect found of direction (or complexity of rule application) on the errors and latency and found no recall by direction interaction. Thus, it is evident that recall (or rule retrieval) and direction (or rule complexity/manipulation) are two different factors affecting performance. However imaging studies were not that helpful. Instead of finding a selective ACC activation effect linked to direction (as per their proposal of ACC as an attentional control region) and a selective PFC activation effect linked to recall (as per their proposal of PFC as a region involved in retrieval), they found that both recall and direction had effects on ACC and PFC activations.

Their second experiment was done with the purpose of dissociating the recall (retrieval) and direction (control) components. However they confounded the study by simultaneously introducing two variables- an additional direction task supposedly requiring an additional control step and not affecting retrieval at all, and a practice variable supposedly only affecting recall (retrieval) and not affecting control (rule manipulation) at all. This however cannot be taken for granted. All 3 trials in this experiment were recall trials. They present results for initial trial, a forward direction trial after some practice and a reverse direction trial after some practice. In my opinion, they should also have provided a simple direction-neutral trial after some practice. Comparison between this and the initial trial (which were same in all respects accept for practice) would have enabled a conclusive association of practice with retrieval ease and with decrease in PFC activation.

Even if the two practice trials (reverse + forward combined) are taken as a substitute for that direction- neutral practice trial (which they unfortunately did not conduct), still one can only derive the decrease in PFC activation due to practice (or ease of retrieval) relationship as a conclusion of this study. The increase in ACC that they observed between the initial trial and the final trials (involving reverse/ forward direction manipulation) are the same results that they observed in experiment one (whereby forward and reverse manipulations in both recall/ explicit condition led to more errors/ latency/ ACC activation) . They prefer to explain this as implying that ACC activation was required because an additional control step was involved); a more parsimonious ( and more in line with the current views of the functions of ACC) explanations is that when the reverse/ forward direction condition is added , then the stimuli that is presented (and which also contains the cue as to in which direction the calculation needs to be done) leads to a stroop-like default automatic forward direction application of the rule and ACC activity is required to choose between the competing responses (if reverse direction cue is present than forward direction response needs to be inhibited). This would predict more RT and errors in the reverse condition (incongruent trials) as opposed to forward conditions (congruent trials). One can even have some control conditions whereby novel sports words (with a novel explicit rule with no directionality associated with it) are displayed in some trials and reactions times and errors measured on these. If the resulting results are same as in Stroop task, perhaps the same mechanisms are in work.

The greater activation in ACC could also be, paradoxically, due to practice. To rule this out, the initial trials having both forward and reverse direction conditions should be compared with later reveres and forward direction trials after practice. Only if no increase in ACC activity is found that can be attributed to practice alone, can the increase in ACC be attributed to the additional control step that was supposedly introduced in experiment 2. A possible scenario where practice could influence ACC activation (and post stimulus response selection mechanism) is where practice or learning could lead to greater salience of activated goal or a stronger top-down expectation resulting in a stronger inhibitory signal for any stimulus that doesn’t meet the top-down expectations. It is not unreasonable to suppose that strength of a rule (the probability with which that rule has been ingrained in memory) may directly reflect in the strength of the biasing that is a result of a top-down expectation of that rule application. In that case , ACC may paradoxically be more and more activated as a result of practice (as the response expectation associated with the stimulus increases in habit strength though learning) to bias the response selection more strongly in favor of the expected response (goal).

In summation, there seems much ground to believe that two attentional processes in working memory /learning and performance are involved – one ACC based and the other PFC based and that they are explained in terms of pre-stimulus goal maintenance and post-stimulus response selection / biasing.

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psychology, lies and videotapes

Ok. I have been tagged. So have to make up some nice sounding traits about myself that would endear me more to my readers :-)


New rules of this tag:
1. Name the person who tagged you.
2. Mention 9 things about you.
3. Tag 6 people.

I. I was tagged by Archana Bahuguna, an old time dear friend.

II. The nine things about me, in no particular order or importance, are:

1. Despite my scientific inclinations and a healthy skepticism, I have explored, and still keep dabbling in esoteric occult subjects like tarot and astrology. I confess to possessing a tarot deck and I used to do light-hearted predictions for my friends while in college (mostly fooling them by telling them what they wanted to hear :-) . At one time I seriously believed in Nostradamus's predictions of an impending third world war and wanted to do my bit to prevent the catastrophe!! Now, hopefully, I have become more reasonable and rigorously scientific-minded, but am still intrigued by the power of these occult sciences to hold ground through the years and thus the fascination still remains.
2. I am one of the silent types and make a poor conversationalist. Over the years I have realized that the best way to hide your foolishness is by keeping mum. Thus, I have to be literally prodded to engage in everyday small talk. The upside of this is that my friends presume that whenever I do manage to find something to say in a conversation, it would be bound to be profound or meaningful!!
3. I'm a financially naive/careless person. I have never managed (or attempted) to make money from money. I do earn well, but I rarely invest that money in money generating instruments like shares or properties. I rationalize this by assuring myself that this lack of financial savvy is due to my professed disregard and antipathy of the capitalist system (emphasizing capital's role over everything else) as the best possible system one could have. I also end up paying more taxes than could have been legally saved using tax-incentive schemes and rationalize this as doing my bit to help the underprivileged.
4. I like to take calculated risks. I like to explore the latent abilities that I either fear to possess or reasonably hope to develop; and to optimally balance my tangential interests and activities with a core moolah generating activity, so as to not end up with a feeling of missed opportunities or a wasted life/talent. Some might say that this is just a propensity towards listlessness and a misguided sense of heroism arising from starting life all over again, but that doesn’t deter me from trying my hands on something new and failing once more!!
5. I am the studious, non-athletic sort of person. I rarely work out and am too lazy/unmotivated to even go for a regular morning walk. Despite an acute realization of the tremendous ill-effect my lack of physical exertion may have on my physical well being, I somehow never manage to place the body over mind. All the free time is either spent in mental wanderings and pursuits, in passive entertainment or in playing with my eight month old kid - only the last providing some physical activity.
6. I like to think of myself as a spiritual person (whatever that means). I concur with Voltaire that if god does not exist, he has to be created. I strongly believe in evolution, but also believe in a higher purpose to life than mere survival, reproduction or increasing inclusive fitness. I believe Morality evolves, Choice evolves and as humans we have evolved to a stage where we have to take responsibility for ourselves as well as others. In this sense, I agree most strongly with the existential school of thought whereby we are responsible for giving essence (or meaning) to our existence. Here too, I am mostly spiritual in the analytical sense and like to focus on right actions as opposed to other experiential forms of enhancing spirituality like meditation or mindfulness.
7. I am fascinated by movies, literature, mythology, art, music and the myriad ways in which the memes/ archetypes originate, replicate and survive in popular culture and the collective unconscious. I prefer aesthetic over utilitarian concerns and believe in the make-believe power of fabricated reality to take care of many of the pressing utilitarian needs. To provide meaning to a person, in some cases, may be more important, than providing food.
8. I believe in the power of the ordinary, rather than the spectacle of the extraordinary. A culture that needs heroes is a potentially sick culture. A culture that doesn’t have room for those lagging behind, either due to differential abilities or circumstances, is a sick culture. A kind word or gesture, a caring in relationships, a sharing of resources (however limited) and a touching of someone else's life for betterment- all everyday acts one can easily indulge in- are equally, if not more, important than say making a once-in-lifetime dramatic new technological or scientific innovation that may be put to good use. One's goodness must reflect in everyday acts and the culture such that it values these everyday acts of heroism and goodness by the ordinary people.
9. I sometimes lie, mostly passively, by not volunteering adverse information about myself. I am not someone who values absolutely or is adamant about the absoluteness of Truth. I believe in creating a fabricated reality if that serves a good purpose. I prefer to lie as infrequently as possible, but as I am a creative writer and have often managed to create decent poetry or prose by generously mixing (autobiographical) fact with fiction, I don't mind putting a spin on presented information, or selectively presenting information that I want. (This does not apply to my scientific blogging - I do try to be objective and truthful there). So, take the above revelations about myself with a pinch of salt!!

Tagging 6 people is the most difficult part. I'm not sure how many of them are going to respond (as my blogosphere consists entirely of psychologists who do not generally blog about personal stuff), but let me try.

I tag the Neurophilosopher, Shelley at the Retrospectacle, Chris at Developing Intelligence, Jake at Pure Pedantry, The Neurocritic and Mary at The Thinking Meat.


Anyone else from the readers, is welcome to get tagged and do leave your URL back in the comments so that the tagging can be traced!

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The Blogger SAT challenge: Read my entry and tell me the score!

I recently took the blogger SAT challenge and though I thought I had done fairly well, came to know that I scored the median score of 3 as judged by the experts. This is way below the perfect 6 I received in Analytical writing section of GRE couple of years back.

So definitely, practice and preparation does matter a lot.

The blog also has a facility for readers to score the essay (and here 2 readers to date have been kind enough to give me a 6), so read on my entry and please give me some encouraging scores/ comments!

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